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Notes
First-Party Bad Faith: The Search for
a Uniform Standard of Culpability
by
DOMINICK C. CAPOZZOLA*
Why is everybody always pickin' on me?
- Charlie Brown, The Coasters'
The whole purpose of insurance is defeated if an insurance
company can refuse or fail, without justification, to pay a valid
claim.
-Vice Chief Justice Holohan, Arizona Supreme Court2
Introduction
In 1973, the Supreme Court of California decided Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.,3 giving birth to a new tort with dramatic
implications for the insurance industry. Known as First-Party Bad
Faith, this tort allows insurance claimants to collect extra-contractual
damages for an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim 4
Since 1973, at least twenty-five other states have adopted the new
tort, weaving First-Party Bad Faith tightly into the fabric of
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A. University of Notre
Dame, 1996. I thank Academic Dean Leo Martinez for introducing me to insurance law
and guiding me throughout this Note. I also thank Professor William Dodge and
Professor Bruce Wagman for their helpful comments. This Note is dedicated to my sister,
Nina, who has been tremendously supportive throughout my law school career.
1. THE COASTERS, Charlie Brown (Atco 1959) (this song was produced as a '45).
2. Noble v. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866,868 (Ariz. 1981).
3. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
4. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 183 (1986).
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America's legal system.5 However, while courts and legislatures
seldom balk at an opportunity to regulate the insurance industry, such
regulations are often at the expense of predictability and national
uniformity. Currently, First-Party Bad Faith jurisprudence is in a
state of confusion, not only because many states refuse to recognize
the tort, but also because those states that do recognize it apply
different standards of culpability.
For the past three decades, our system of federalism has allowed
courts to experiment with various solutions to the problem of First-
Party Bad Faith. These experiments have produced standards of
insurer culpability ranging from strict liability to malice.6 Thus, in
some states, an honest mistake will expose an insurer to Bad Faith
damages, while in other states such damages attach only to malicious
activity on the part of the insurer. As a consequence, the location of
5. Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989); Noble, 624 P.2d at 866: Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio,
706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 530 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1987):
Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996); White v. Unigard Mut.
Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993):
Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1988); Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 784
S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242 (Miss.
1985); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1982); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464
N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991); United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 780 P.2d 193 (Nev. 1989);
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1974); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983); Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899
(Okla. 1978); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); Nichols v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983); Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co, 399
N.W.2d 320 (S.D. 1987); Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1987); Anderson v. Cont. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978); McCullough v. Golden
Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990).
The author uses the term "at least" because some states allow for similar damages on
expanded notions of contract law. Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d
254, 264 (Del. 1995); Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 652 (Me. 1993):
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581-82 (N.H. 1978) (allowing
compensatory damages for economic losses); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795.
801-02 (Utah 1985) (permitting consequential damages for attorney fees, economic loss,
and emotional distress); Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73. 80-81 (W.
Va. 1986) (recognizing compensatory damages without regard to good faith or bad faith
while recognizing punitive damages only upon evidence that "the company actually knew
that the policyholder's claim was proper, but willfully, maliciously and intentionally denied
the claim"). Similarly, two states-Florida and Pennsylvania-have enacted statutes
covering bad faith actions. FLA. STAT. ch. 624.155 (Supp. 1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8371 (West Supp. 1999).
6. See infra Part II.
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an accident or "occurrence ' 7 can significantly affect how the insurers
handle the resulting claim. If an accident occurs in a strict liability
state, the knowledge that small errors can lead to large damages will
encourage the insurers to use extreme caution when handling that
claim. However, if the same accident or occurrence takes place in a
state with malice as the standard, the insurers can take a less cautious
approach, knowing that they will face tort damages only by willfully
acting in bad faith.
The articulation of a uniform, bright-line standard controlling the
availability of punitive and consequential damages would better serve
the interests of both the parties and the judicial system. The insurers
could conduct business across state lines without fear of unanticipated
liability from the judiciary. The insureds would benefit, because the
insurers would act in accordance with a legally-imposed standard
designed to protect the insureds. Also, the national judiciary could
finally put three decades of experimentation to rest by accepting a
uniform rule that properly balances the interests of those involved.
This Note argues in favor of First-Party Bad Faith, provided that
the courts and legislatures can arrive at a consensus on what standard
of culpability merits civil liability. It begins by describing the tort,
outlining the arguments that courts have used both in support of and
in opposition to First-Party Bad Faith. Then, this Note analyzes the
approaches that the courts have used in their efforts to isolate a useful
and fair standard of conduct. It then discusses the developing trends,
filtering out the policies behind those standards. Looking to those
policies, this Note proposes a uniform standard of culpability that
would allow for the predictability and fairness that the tort of First-
Party Bad Faith does not yet provide.
This standard, which will be repeated and explained toward the
end of this Note,8 is stated as follows: When a policyholder
substantially prevails in a first-party claim, the policyholder is entitled
to all consequential damages that resulted from the insurer's error,
regardless of the insurer's intent. If the policyholder can establish
that the insurer acted maliciously or recklessly in regard to the claim,
the court shall also award punitive damages. This standard will bring
the uniformity that insurers and insureds need while appropriately
balancing the concerns of both sides. But before delving into the
concerns surrounding First-Party Bad Faith, it would be prudent to
7. "Occurrence" is the term used in most insurance policies that refers to the accident
or event against which the insureds are insuring.
8. See infra Part III.
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take a step back and consider what First-Party Bad Faith is and how it
developed.
I. First-Party Bad Faith
The concept of Bad Faith is derived from an elementary
principle of contract law, known as the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement."9 The failure of a
party to abide by this obligation of good faith is what courts have
termed "Bad Faith," 10 and it creates a cause of action under law.
Courts have applied Bad Faith to the insurance arena for over
eighty-five years.1 It occurred first in the 1914 case of Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 12 when the New York Court of Appeals held
that an insurance company's failure to appeal on behalf of its insured
rendered the company liable for the cost of the appeal.13 The court
held that "there is a contractual obligation of universal force which
underlies all written agreements. It is the obligation of good faith in
carrying out what is written. The defendant's failure to observe this
requirement of the contract in suit is the thing upon which its liability
may safely be predicated. '14
Brassil involved a third-party insurance claim.15 Third-party
claims occur when the insured harms a person who is not a party to
the insurance contract. When the harmed person makes a claim
against the insured, the insurance company assumes responsibility for
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
10. For a more thorough definition of First-Party Bad Faith, see WILLIAM M.
SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 5.02 (1999). See also ROBERT
H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1996) ("'[G]ood faith' and
'bad faith' remain elusive concepts with no universally accepted definition. Despite these
uncertainties, the use of 'good faith' and 'bad faith' as standards to test the propriety of
insurers' conduct gives courts and juries considerable flexibility in adjusting the relative
interests of insurers and insureds.").
11. Neil A. Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be Solved?: Are Punitive Damages
Awardable in New York for First-Party Bad Faith?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 723,727 (1993).
12. 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).
13. Id. at 624.
14. Id.
15. Id. In Brassil, the plaintiff's insurance company opted to try two personal injury
actions in court, even though the injured parties wanted to settle for an amount within the
policy limits. The judgment in the underlying action returned over twice the amount of
the proposed settlement. The insurance company refused to appeal, so Brassil paid for the
appeal himself. Brassil wanted compensation for the appeal from his insurance company.
Id. at 622-23.
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the defense and the settlement.16 Automobile and other liability
insurance policies usually cover third-party claims.
First-party claims, on the other hand, occur when the person
insured on a policy-usually the policyholder-suffers an injury and
seeks compensation directly from the insurance company.'7 Common
examples of the first-party relationship include fire or health
insurance; when the insured's house burns down or when the insured
is hospitalized, she expects the insurance company to provide
compensation.
Thus, Third-Party Bad Faith occurs when an insurance company,
in bad faith, refuses to defend or settle a claim against another party.
By contrast, First-Party Bad Faith occurs when the insurer, in bad
faith, refuses to settle a claim with the contracting party. Despite the
significant differences between the two torts, to understand the
development of First-Party Bad Faith one must first understand how
the Bad Faith tort developed in the third-party context.
18
A. Incubation and Birth in the Golden State
Breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing led to
contract remedies for the greater part of the twentieth century. 19 It
was not until 1958 that the Supreme Court of California became the
first court of last resort to hold that, at least in third-party insurance
cases, breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing can
result in tort liability. That case, Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co.,20 involved injured pedestrians who filed suit against
the driver of the vehicle that struck them.21 Because the driver did
not own the vehicle, his insurer denied responsibility.22 Although the
pedestrians offered to settle for $4,000-well within the $10,000
policy limit-the insurer refused, and the case went to trial.23 The
verdict from the original trial returned $26,250 for the plaintiffs.24
16. KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON GENERAL
PRACTICE INSURANCE LAW 127 (3d ed. 1994).
17. Id
18. See Mary Elizabeth Phelan, The First Party Dilemma: Bad Faith or Bad Business?,
34 DRAKE L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1985-86).
19. See Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 727.
20. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
21. Id. at 200.
22. Id.
23. Idt
24. Id.
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In Comunale, the California Supreme Court stated that good
faith requires an insurer to settle a dispute, even if the policy does not
expressly impose such a duty:
When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so
that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a
settlement which can be made within those limits, a consideration
in good faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle
the claim. Its unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.25
The court held that an insurer that wrongfully declines both to defend
and to accept a reasonable settlement within the policy limits is liable
for the entire judgment, even if it exceeds the limits of the policy.26
Many scholars have noted, however, that the fiduciary duties to
defend and to accept a reasonable settlement are unique to the third-
party context.27 Some courts have relied on this distinction to explain
why only Third-Party Bad Faith should sound in tort: "In the first-
party situation.., the reasons for finding a fiduciary relationship and
imposing a corresponding duty are absent. No relationship of trust
and reliance is created by the contract; it simply obligates the insurer
to pay claims submitted by the insured in accordance with the
contract.'"28
For fifteen years, this logic confined the tort of Bad Faith to the
third-party context only. However, in 1973, the Supreme Court of
California once again extended the liability of insurers for breaching
the duty of good faith-this time holding insurers liable for extra-
contractual (tort) damages in the first-party context.29 In Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Co.,30 the plaintiff's cocktail lounge and restaurant
business sustained substantial fire damage. 31 Due to arson charges
pending against the plaintiff, his attorney advised him not to appear
before the insurers' attorneys.32 After the magistrate dismissed the
25. Id. at 201; see also YORK ET AL., supra note 17, at 133.
26. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 202.
27. See, e.g., SHERNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at §§ 21.03[1], 21.04[1].
28. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Ironically, after the
Utah Supreme Court criticized California for allowing tort damages, it then proceeded to
award the plaintiff emotional distress damages under a precarious extension of contract
law. Id. at 802.
29. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973); see also Kelly H.
Thompson, Comment, Bad Faith: Limiting Insurers' Extra-Contractual Liability in Texas,
41 Sw. L.J. 719, 719 (1987) ("California pioneered the development of insurers' extra-
contractual liability .....
30. 510 P.2d at 1032.
31. Id. at 1034.
32. Id. at 1035.
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arson charges, the plaintiff wished to submit himself to the insurers'
attorneys for examination.33 However, the insurers decided to deny
liability because of the plaintiff's earlier refusal to appear.34
In its analysis, the Gruenberg court discussed the insurer's duty
of good faith and fair dealing:
In [Comunale], we considered the duty of the insurer to act in good
faith and fairly in handling the claims of third persons against the
insured, described as a "duty to accept reasonable settlements"; in
the case before us we consider the duty of an insurer to act in good
faith and fairly in handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty
not to withhold unreasonably payments due under a policy. These
are merely two different aspects of the same duty." 35
With one sentence, the court bridged the gap between first-party and
third-party obligations of good faith, holding that an insurer's failure
to perform its contractual duties with its insured may also give rise to
a tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.36 After this holding, other jurisdictions began to adopt the
tort of First-Party Bad Faith; the next section explains why.
B. The Debate over First-Party Bad Faith
At the outset, it is worth describing what insureds will gain from
a tort cause of action over a contract cause of action. Generally,
contract law limits the recovery for breach of contract to the damages
"that arise naturally from the breach or those that were in the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. '37
Under this formula, damages for breach of an insurance contract
would amount to the monetary value the contract would have yielded
if the insurer performed its obligations.38 Thus, an insurer that
breaches its obligation to pay a $10,000 insurance policy will be liable
under contract law for $10,000. By contrast, tort law allows plaintiffs
to recover compensatory damages and punitive damages, in addition
to the value of the contract.39 Under this formula, the same insurer
would have to pay $10,000, plus the amount needed to compensate
the insured for any loss suffered by the delay (compensatory
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1037.
36. Id.
37. Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50,53 (Mich. 1980); see also Hadley
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145,151 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
38. Kewin, 295 N.W.2d at 53.
39. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIvES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 613, 650 (6th ed. 1996).
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damages), plus the amount needed to deter the insurance company
from breaching its contracts in the future (punitive damages). As one
might expect, tort damages can greatly exceed the damages
recoverable in contract.
Courts awarding tort damages for breaches of insurance
contracts do so under the theory that tort damages are needed to
prevent insurance companies from mistreating their insureds. To
justify this break from long-established rules of contract law, courts
often go to great lengths to distinguish the insurance contract from
other types of contracts. Consequently, the arguments in favor of
First-Party Bad Faith usually "pertain to the unequal bargaining
position of insured and insurer and the public interest nature of the
industry. '40 By contrast, the arguments against First-Party Bad Faith
generally rest on traditional contract principles and legislative
deference. 41 It is worth studying each of these arguments in detail,
because the policies for and against First-Party Bad Faith are
germane to the ultimate issue of this Note, namely, the proper
standard of culpability.
(1) All in favor
The most compelling argument for First-Party Bad Faith states
that, without the tort, insurers have a perverse incentive to
"arbitrarily deny coverage and delay payment of a claim with no
more penalty than interest on the amount owed. '42 Courts frequently
express concern about insurance companies that delay or refuse
payment with the hope that the claimant will give up and disappear.
In Nichols v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,43 for
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina accepted First-Party
Bad Faith to prevent just that kind of activity.44 In its holding the
court explained: "Absent the threat of a tort action, the insurance
company can, with complete impunity, deny any claim they wish,
whether valid or not. '45
40. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1980).
41. See infra Part I.B.2.
42. Spencer, 611 P.2d at 152.
43. 306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983).
44. Id. at 619.
45. Id.
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While insurance companies often keep teams of attorneys on
staff, insureds seldom have lawyers immediately available.46 This
discrepancy exacerbates the problem; the forbidding prospect of
litigation discourages insureds with small or debatable claims from
bringing the insurers to court, leaving insurers free to profit at the
expense of the insureds. The availability of tort damages encourages
claimants to bring suits against insurance companies that deny
liability. This, in turn, deters insurance companies from denying
claims arbitrarily, thereby preventing-or at least substantially
limiting-the unfair handling of claims.
Another argument for First-Party Bad Faith stems from the
unequal bargaining position between insurers and insureds.47 "[T]he
contract and the nature of the relationship effectively give the insurer
an almost adjudicatory responsibility. The insurer evaluates the
claim, determines whether it falls within the coverage provided,
assesses its monetary value, decides on its validity and passes upon
payment." 48 Some courts have suggested that the extra leverage
provided by First-Party Bad Faith will help the insured to even her
bargaining position.49
In a similar vein, many sympathetic courts have pointed to the
vulnerable position of the insureds to justify First-Party Bad Faith.50
When an insured makes claims on his insurance policy, it is usually
because he has suffered a significant injury; "he may be in dire
financial straits and therefore may be especially vulnerable to
oppressive tactics by an insurer seeking a settlement or a release." 51
A Bad Faith cause of action can serve as additional protection for
insureds at the time they need it the most. As one court fervently
asserted: "The law will not allow an insurer to willfully refuse to
evaluate or honor a claim with the knowledge that the avowed
46. Of course, this is not always true when the insureds are large corporations. This
explains in part why the cases in which the various states have adopted bad faith seldom
list corporations as plaintiffs.
47. See Nichols, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
48. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334,344 (Haw. 1996).
49. E.g., Craft v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1978); Grand Sheet
Metal Prods. Co. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. 1977); Spencer v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149,152 (Kan. 1980).
50. E.g., Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981); Hoskins v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio 1983).
51. Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 118 (6th Cir. 1976), quoted in
Hoskins, 452 N.E.2d at 1319.
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purpose of the insurance contract was to protect the insured at his
weakest and most perilous time of need."52
Not all arguments for First-Party Bad Faith are grounded in
equity considerations; some courts have argued that the mere
recognition of Bad Faith in third-party situations suffices to justify the
recognition of Bad Faith in the first-party context.53 These courts
contend that the rationale behind Third-Party Bad Faith "is equally
applicable and of equal importance" to First-Party Bad Faith.54 In
Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,55 the Supreme Court of Ohio
expanded on this concept:
The liability of the insurer in [third-party] cases does not arise from
its mere omission to perform a contract obligation, for it is well
established in Ohio that it is no tort to breach a contract, regardless
of motive. Rather, the liability arises from the breach of the
positive legal duty imposed by law due to the relationships of the
parties. This legal duty is the duty imposed upon the insurer to act
in good faith and its bad faith refusal to settle a claim is a breach of
that duty and imposes liability sounding in tort.56
Other courts have justified the tort of First-Party Bad Faith
because the unique features of the insurance industry raise public
policy considerations.57 When adopting First-Party Bad Faith. the
Supreme Court of Alaska found the following language persuasive:
[A] related concern is the expectation of the insurance-consuming
public which the industry has fostered itself. Allstate's slogan
"You're in Good Hands," Travelers' motto of protection "Under
the Umbrella," and Fireman's Fund's symbolic protection beneath
the "Fireman's Hat," exemplify the industry's own efforts to
portray itself as a repository of the public trust. But with the public
trust may be vested responsibility for a violation of such trust .... 58
52. Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., 373 So. 2d 1054, 1067 (Ala. 1979)
(Embry, J., dissenting), quoted in Chavers, 405 So. 2d at 6.
53. E.g., Hoskins, 452 N.E.2d at 1320; Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,
375 (Wis. 1978).
54. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 375.
55. 452 N.E.2d at 1315.
56. Id. at 1320 (citations omitted).
57. E.g., White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Idaho 1986) (quoting
Charles M. Louderback & Thomas W. Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. Rev. 187, 200-01 (1982)). The court in White cited as
distinguishing factors "[tjhe adhesionary aspects of the insurance contract, including the
lack of bargaining strength of the insured, the contracts [sic] standardized terms, the
motivation of the insured for entering into the transaction and the nature of the service for
which the contract is executed." 730 P.2d at 1019.
58. Russel H. McMains, Bad Faith Claims Handling-New Frontiers: A Multi-State
Cause of Action in Search of a Home, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 901, 904 (1988). quoted in State
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Some courts, elaborating on the unique nature of insurance
contracts, have noted that insureds do not purchase insurance to
obtain a commercial advantage.59 Rather, "the insured's objective...
is security from financial loss which he or she may sustain from claims
against him or her and protection against economic catastrophe in
those situations in which he or she may be the victim. ' 60 People
purchase insurance because they seek peace of mind.61 This peace of
mind is lost if insureds cannot rely on their insurers to uphold their
contractual obligations. Thus, the extra tort remedy may be
necessary to secure the benefit of the bargain for the insured.
(2) Those opposed
The arguments put forth by the jurisdictions rejecting First-Party
Bad Faith generally fall into two categories. 62 First, some courts
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156 n.6 (Alaska 1989); see also Nichols
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E. 616, 619 (S.C. 1983) ("The public policy
reasons for recognizing this cause of action are plentiful. The insurance business is
affected with a public interest.").
59. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334,343 (Haw. 1996).
60. Id. at 344.
61. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149,152 (Kan. 1980).
62. There are a few other rationales in opposition to First-Party Bad Faith cited by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 611 P.2d at 153,
that should be addressed. I have chosen to discuss them in a footnote rather than in the
text because the arguments are not raised frequently enough to merit serious attention,
and because the arguments can be dispensed with rather quickly.
First, citing Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1021-22
(Or. 1978), the Kansas Supreme Court noted that "some courts conclude that the 'peace of
mind' argument does not justify a bad faith cause of action because every contract is
entered into for peace of mind." Spencer, 611 P.2d at 153. However, the "peace of mind"
argument is only one of many reasons to adopt First-Party Bad Faith. Furthermore, the
Kansas Supreme Court's argument glosses over a crucial distinction between the insurance
contract and all other contracts. It may be true that peace of mind attaches to all
contracts, whether they are contracts for insurance or contracts for products and services.
However, the principal purpose of contracts for products and services is to acquire those
goods and services. With the insurance contract, on the other hand, the principal purpose
of the contract is to acquire security and peace of mind. The purchaser of an insurance
contract does not stand to gain any material benefit; she only stands to lose. To take away
her peace of mind, then, is to take away the benefit of the bargain.
Second, also citing Farris, the Spencer court noted that "some cases reject the
argument that the insurance industry is imbued with public interest justifying the
recognition of the tort of bad faith." Id. at 153. However, later in the opinion, the Spencer
court itself rejected this argument, noting that "the Kansas legislature has long recognized
the insurance industry is imbued with the public interest as evidenced by the creation in
1927 of the Kansas Department of Insurance." Id. at 156.
Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court also noted in passing that one court rejected the
notion that the insurance contract in question was an adhesion contract because it was
approved by the insured. Id at 153 (citing A. A. A. Pool Serv. & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna
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continue to assert that the rationale behind Third-Party Bad Faith
simply does not apply to First-Party Bad Faith. These courts hold
that the rationale behind Third-Party Bad Faith is "[t]he dilemma
presented by the absolute control of trial and settlement vested in the
insurer by the insurance contract and the conflicting interests of the
insurer and insured." 63 Disapproving of First-Party Bad Faith, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire remarked:
This dilemma is lacking in the first-party claim. The insurer is not
in a position to expose the insured to a judgment in excess of the
policy limits through its unreasonable refusal to settle a case, nor is
it in a position to otherwise injure the insured by virtue of its
exclusive control over the defense of the case.64
Courts adhering to this argument believe that only third-party claims
can produce damages that are not recoverable under contract law.65
These courts also note that in first-party cases, the parties are in
an adverse relationship.66  Contrasting third-party and first-party
insurance, the Supreme Court of Utah explained, "[i]n the [third-
party] situation, the insurer must act in good faith and be as zealous in
protecting the interests of the insured as it would be in regard to its
own. In the [first-party] situation, the insured and the insurer are, in
effect and practically speaking, adversaries. '67 The implication is
that, as adversaries, each party should expect the other to look out for
its own interests.
Second, some courts conclude that tort remedies are not
appropriate because statutorily created causes of action exclude the
need for judicial remedies. The Illinois Appellate Court put this
argument forward in Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha:
We are of the opinion that the legislature has intended to provide a
remedy to an insured who encounters unnecessary difficulties with
an unreasonable and vexatious insurance company.... Where the
legislature has provided a remedy on a subject matter we are not
Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 A.2d 724, 726 (R.I. 1978)). Appropriately, the court did not pay
much attention to that notion; insurance contracts are frequently described as the
quintessential adhesion contract. Gregory R. Kim, Note, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,
Unconscionability of Presumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts,
70 CAL. L. REV. 1014, 1026 (1982) ("The typical adhesion contract situation involves a
consumer who contracts with a powerful entity such as an insurance company .... ").
63. Dumas v. State Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 781, 783 (N.H. 1971), quoted in
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978).
64. Lawton, 392 A.2d at 581.
65. Debolt v. Mut. of Omaha, 371 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67. Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 480 P.2d 739, 745 (Utah 1971), quoted in
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985).
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only loath but in addition harbor serious doubts as to the
desirability and wisdom of implementing or expanding the
legislative remedy by judicial decree.68
This argument is persuasive, particularly if the state legislatures
express their intention to limit the remedies available to the
insureds.69
(3) The Ayes Have It
The jurisdictions that refuse to recognize First-Party Bad Faith
often point out that a breach of contract does not warrant tort
damages unless the breach itself constitutes an independent, willful
tort.70 Jurisdictions accepting First-Party Bad Faith would agree with
this principle. However, these jurisdictions would also note that First-
Party Bad Faith does not arise from the contract breach, but from the
insurer's failure to act in good faith toward its insureds.71 The holding
in Lipinski v. Title Insurance Co.72 is instructive: "[I]nsurance
companies have a duty to act in good faith with their insureds, and...
this duty exists independent of the insurance contract and
independent of statute."73
The contention that the fiduciary duty present in the third-party
relationship is lacking in first-party insurance policies misses the issue,
because it places the focus on the type of contract and the resulting
breach. However, Bad Faith does not arise from a breach of contract;
rather, "[lt is a separate intentional wrong, which results from a
breach of duty imposed as a consequence of the relationship
established by contract." 74  Bad Faith stems from an obligation,
implied by law, to act in the best interests of the insured. This
obligation attaches to all insurance contracts-not just third-party
contracts-and courts should enforce it accordingly. Reprehensible
conduct is reprehensible without regard to the context.
Courts that reject First-Party Bad Faith because of the
adversarial relationship present in the first-party insurance context
must take a second look at the purpose of insurance. In other types
of contracts, the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
68. 371 N.E.2d at 377.
69. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,52 (1987).
70. E.g., Debolt, 371 N.E.2d at 376.
71. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973); Lipinski v. Title Ins.
Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977 (Mont. 1982).
72. 655 P.2d at 970.
73. Id. at 977.
74. Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,374 (Wis. 1978).
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governs ordinary performance under the contract. For instance, in a
contract for the sale of goods, the buyer and seller each must deal
fairly with one another in their ordinary course of performance.
However, when disputes arise, each party should anticipate that the
other will protect its own interests; there is no obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in the litigation proceedings. But in the insurance
context, the insurer's contractual obligation usually does not arise
until it is time to determine damages under the policy. To assert that
the insured should expect the insurer to protect its own interest
effectively writes the implied obligation of good faith out of the
contract, because the whole purpose of insurance is for the insurance
company to protect the interests of the insured.
The jurisdictions that restrict Bad Faith to the third-party context
often pretend that contract damages are sufficient to preserve first-
party claims. However, mere contract damages fail to give the
policyholder the benefit of the bargain. At some point, courts must
recognize that first-party insureds also pay for protection and peace
of mind; they look to contract with an entity that, like a good
neighbor, will make sure that the insureds are in good hands when
they fall on hard times. Although the threat of judgments in excess of
policy limits is not present in the first-party context,75 the first-party
relationship does present the threat of other damages that can exceed
the limit of the policy, including pre-judgment interest, attorney fees,
emotional distress, and consequential economic damages.76 Insureds
need First-Party Bad Faith to secure against those damages.
Some states, it is true, offer statutory remedies to protect
insureds from the damages mentioned above.77 These remedies often
75. Contrast this with the third-party context, such as in Comunale, where the insurer's
failure to settle led to damages against the insured in excess of the insurance policy limits.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
76. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 183.
77. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (Michie 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155
(West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (Michie 1998); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (1993); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.12-235(3), 304.39-220 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2436 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.2006(4) (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.296, 375.420 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-
1-616 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-1 (Michie 1999):
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.061 (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
8371 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-
12-3 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105(B) (1994); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
21.55 (Vernon Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-15-108, 31A-22-309 (1999): VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8,§ 3390 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 807.01(4) (West 1994): WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26-12-206, 26-15-124 (Michie 1999).
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suffice in cases involving minimal damages or in cases where the
insurance companies' actions do not rise to the level of bad faith.
However, in cases involving manifest instances of Bad Faith, many
courts have held that the applicable state remedies are neither
adequate nor controlling.
For instance, in Buckman v. People Express, Inc.,78 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut rejected the defendant's attempt to limit the
plaintiff's causes of action to those enumerated in the Connecticut
General Statutes: "[T]his court recognizes an independent cause of
action in tort arising from an insurer's common law duty of good
faith. This cause of action is separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
statutory claims. '79 Throughout the United States, the common law
exists side by side with statutory law; in the absence of a statute
expressly limiting the causes of action for bad faith, other states are
free to follow Connecticut's logic.
Finally, courts considering First-Party Bad Faith would profit
from a de novo look at the reason most Contracts scholars oppose the
application of tort damages to contract breaches, because the courts
would see that the opposition rests on notions that are inapposite to
the insurance context. In The Case for Punitive Damages in
Contracts,80 Professor William Dodge examines the reasons why
courts traditionally have refused to award punitive damages for
breach of contract. In his analysis, Professor Dodge notes that there
are two categories of willful breaches: "opportunistic" and
"efficient."8' With opportunistic breaches, "[t]he opportunistic actor
creates more for himself, but only by taking an equivalent amount or
more value from others." 8 Opportunistic breaches usually lead to a
net loss in society. "By contrast, a breach is efficient if it makes the
breaching party so much better off that she could compensate the
nonbreaching party for his losses and still come out ahead. ' 83 Judge
Richard Posner, a central figure in the Law and Economics school,
78. 530 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1987).
79. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
80. William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629
(1999). Professor Dodge argues that the threat of punitive damages will compel parties
who want to breach their contracts to negotiate for a release, thereby ensuring that all
parties are adequately compensated while reducing the cost of litigation. Id. at 633-35.
81. Id. at 652.
82. Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument
for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract,
58 Brook. L. Rev. 877, 880 (1992), quoted in Dodge, supra note 80, at 652.
83. Dodge, supra note 80, at 652-53.
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believes efficient breaches should not be discouraged by punitive
damages.84
Professor Dodge discusses at length Posner's "theory of efficient
breach," calling it the "standard explanation of why punitive damages
are not awarded for breach of contract. '85 His theory, simply stated,
suggests that "[i]f a widget manufacturer, by breaching her contract
with A and selling to B, can make enough to compensate A for his
loss and still come out ahead, she should do so. ''86 In situations where
one party, by breaching, can make all parties better off, extra-
contractual damages would lead to inefficient results. However, there
are no efficient breaches in the insurance context; breaches of
insurance contracts can only be opportunistic. It is impossible for a
breaching insurance company to make both parties better off,
because any dollar withheld by the insurance company is a dollar not
received by the insureds.87 This means that the theory of efficient
breach has no bearing on the insurance industry. Thus, while the
courts that still reject First-Party Bad Faith can ground their
adherence to contract remedies in tradition, they cannot say that this
tradition is supported by contemporary wisdom.
II. The Standards
Indeed, when examined closely, it becomes evident that the
arguments against First-Party Bad Faith no longer should prevent the
remaining states from accepting the tort. However, the decision to
adopt First-Party Bad Faith is only the beginning. Courts must also
provide a useful standard of culpability by which to determine when
an insurer's activities reach the level of Bad Faith. Unfortunately,
among the courts that have adopted First-Party Bad Faith, there has
been little agreement over the proper standard. Some courts require
a dishonest, malicious, or oppressive act,88 while others have endorsed
extra-contractual damages whenever the insureds prevail on a first-
party claim, even if the insurance company acted reasonably.89 As a
consequence, the insurance companies are receiving mixed signals
about how they should conduct themselves concerning first-party
claims.
84. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 142 (5th ed. 1998).
85. Dodge, supra note 80, at 631.
86. Id.
87. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 178-79.
88. Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Broadway Arms Corp.. 664 S.W.2d 463,465 (Ark. 1983).
89. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986).
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This Part will discuss the development of the various standards
that the courts have applied to First-Party Bad Faith. The first
standard to emerge was the "unreasonableness" standard set forth by
the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg. Five years after the
Gruenberg decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Anderson
v. Continental Insurance Co.,90 adopting a more rigorous recklessness
standard.91  Other courts, unable to award tort damages for
unintentional behavior, have required a deliberate, malicious act.92
Of the remaining courts, two have adopted a gross negligence
standard, while West Virginia stands alone with its use of strict
liability.
A. The Gruenberg Standard
When the California Supreme Court decided Gruenberg, it drew
upon fifteen years of experience with Third-Party Bad Faith, stating
that the duty to act in good faith in third-party claims and the duty to
act in good faith in first-party claims are "merely two different aspects
of the same duty. ' 93 Not surprisingly, when the court needed a first-
party standard, it looked to its third-party cases. 94 Citing Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co.,95 one of its landmark Third-Party Bad Faith
cases, the California Supreme Court delineated the First-Party Bad
Faith standard as follows: "Accordingly, when the insurer
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its
insured, it is subject to liability in tort. '96
The author of the leading treatise on insurance bad faith
litigation has interpreted the Gruenberg standard, stating that
"[u]nder Gruenberg... , the test for insurer bad faith in first party
situations is whether the insurer has acted unreasonably in handling
an insured's claim by failing to compensate the insured, without
proper cause, for a loss covered by the policy." 97 Hence, if an insurer
fails to act reasonably, then under the Gruenberg standard it is
vulnerable to a bad faith claim. Although the term "Bad Faith"
would seem to require some form of scienter, under Gruenberg
90. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
91. Id. at 376.
92. E.g., Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d at 465.
93. 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973).
94. Id.
95. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
96. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1038.
97. SHERNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, § 5.02[2].
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intentional behavior is not needed; acting unreasonably98 alone will
suffice.
B. The Anderson Standard
Five years after Gruenberg, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
confronted with a remarkably similar case. In Anderson v.
Continental Insurance Co.,99 the defendant insurance company
refused to pay the plaintiffs' fire insurance claim, and the court had to
determine whether Wisconsin recognized First-Party Bad Faith.1°°
The court held that Wisconsin did recognize the tort,101 and in doing
so, it looked with caution to the California Supreme Court's decision
in Gruenberg. z02 While the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved of
Gruenberg's recognition that the duty of good faith applies equally to
first-party and third-party claims, it disapproved of Gruenberg's
adoption of the unreasonableness standard.10 3 The court feared that
such a standard would allow insureds to "scar[e] insurers into paying
questionable claims because of the threat of a bad faith suit."1°4 The
court believed that this would cause insurance rates to climb while
constructively depriving insurance companies of their right to litigate
a fairly debatable claim. 105
To prevent these undesirable results, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court instituted the following standard: "To show a claim for bad
faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for
denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or
reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the
claim. ' '106 Thus, according to the Anderson standard, unreasonably
failing to compensate the insured will not yield tort damages unless
the insurance company is aware-or recklessly chooses to disregard-
that there is no reasonable basis for denying a claim.
98. In earlier drafts of this Note, the author used the term "negligence" in place of
"acting unreasonably." Although functionally equivalent, "acting unreasonably" seems to
impose an objective good faith standard that is absent from the concept of negligence. I
thank Professor William Dodge for bringing this distinction to my attention.
99. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
100. Id. at 372-73.
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id. at 375-77.
103. Id.
104. John W. Thornton & Milton S. Blaut, Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and
Punitive Damages, 12 FORUM 699,719 (1977), quoted in Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
105. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377 (citing Thornton & Blaut, supra note 104, at 719).
106. Id. at 376.
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C. The Gross Negligence Standard
A pair of jurisdictions-Mississippi and New Mexico-have
come down between Gruenberg and Anderson, conditioning a finding
of First-Party Bad Faith on the insurer's gross negligence in the
handling of a claim. 107 This standard requires more than a mere
unreasonable act, but less than the recklessness required in
Anderson.10 8 In Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co.,109 the New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction which allowed
punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct by the insurer."0
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Day,"' the Supreme
Court of Mississippi also adopted the gross negligence standard: "To
recover punitive damage from an insurer for amounts over and above
policy benefits an insured must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence either (1) that the insurer acted with malice or (2) that the
insurer acted with gross negligence or reckless disregard for the rights
of others.""12 The court stated, however, that ordinary or simple
negligence did not merit tort damages." 3
It is difficult to articulate both the difference between gross
negligence and recklessness and the difference between gross
negligence and acting unreasonably. Quite often, the distinctions
turn on the facts of the case and the available precedent. As a
consequence of its factual dependence, the gross negligence standard
offers little to work with when analyzing the proper standard for
First-Party Bad Faith. Arguments for gross negligence necessarily
repeat the arguments used for the Gruenberg and Anderson
standards.
D. The Intent Requirement
For some courts, the standards adopted in Gruenberg and
Anderson (as well as the gross negligence standard) do not
adequately protect the insurer's right to contest claims. These courts
choose to omit the "reckless disregard" element of the Anderson
107. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1986); Jessen v. Nat'l
Excess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1989); see also Roger C. Henderson, The Tort
of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two Decades, 37 ARIz. L. REv.
1153, 1158 (1995).
108. For a general discussion of the gross negligence standard, see Jessen, 776 P.2d at
1247.
109. 776 P.2d at 1244.
110. Id. at 1247.
111. 487 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1986).
112. Id. at 832.
113. Id.
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standard," 4 requiring for First-Party Bad Faith that the insurance
companies withhold payment with full knowledge that there is no
reasonable basis for doing so. 115  Adopting this standard, the
Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
[I]n order to be successful a claim based on the tort of bad faith
must include affirmative misconduct by the insurance company,
without a good faith defense, and.., the misconduct must be
dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to avoid its liability
under an insurance policy. Such a claim cannot be based upon
good faith denial, offers to compromise a claim or for other honest
errors of judgment by the insurer. Neither can this type claim be
based upon negligence or bad judgment so long as the insurer is
acting in good faith. 116
Such a strict standard licenses the insurance companies to resist
and litigate debatable claims without fear of excessive damages." 7
This approach recognizes that disagreements can arise over a number
of insurance issues, and that "[r]esort to a judicial forum is not per se
bad faith or unfair dealing on the part of the insurer regardless of the
outcome of the suit."" 8
E. Strict Liability
On the opposite end of the spectrum, West Virginia has
approved a standard that would allow for extra-compensatory
damages without regard to the insurers' intent. In Hayseeds, Inc. v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty,119 the court noted that consequential
damage awards frequently "turn on judicial interpretation of such
malleable and easily manipulated concepts as 'reasonable,'
'unreasonable,' 'wrongful,' 'good faith' and 'bad faith."'1 20 The court
believed that the following standard would serve the interests of both
parties: "[W]hen a policyholder substantially prevails in a property
damage suit against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to
damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as
well as an award for aggravation and inconvenience.' 121
114. E.g., Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978).
115. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark.
1983); Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1977).
116. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d at 465 (emphasis added).
117. Christian, 577 P.2d at 904-05.
118. Id. at 905.
119. 352 S.E.2d 73 (W.Va. 1986).
120. Id. at 80.
121. Id.
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This standard has two significant benefits. First, it offers a clear
rule which will eliminate the need to quarrel over the distinction
between acting unreasonably and acting recklessly. Second, it
encourages the insured to litigate small and debatable claims,
knowing that they will recover their attorney fees and other losses if
successful.122
I. The Appropriate Standard
The variety of standards adopted by the courts provides
insurance companies with little direction. In Arkansas, a First-Party
Bad Faith claim based on the insurer's honest mistake would not
survive a motion for summary judgment, whereas in West Virginia,
the same claim under the same policy would yield extensive damages.
The articulation of a clear, bright line standard controlling the
availability of punitive and consequential damages would better serve
the interests of both the parties and the judicial system.123 This Part
examines the current standards in light of the policy arguments that
surround First-Party Bad Faith. It then proposes a standard that will
protect the interests of the insureds while shielding the insurers from
non-meritorious Bad Faith suits.
A. Shaping the Standard
There is little question that insureds need protection from
opportunistic insurers. The lack of bargaining power and the
vulnerability of the insureds, combined with the insurers' incentive to
breach, set insurance contracts apart from other types of contracts.
Compensatory and punitive damages will deter insurance companies
from denying meritorious claims while encouraging insureds to
litigate. On the other hand, it would be bad policy to deprive
insurance companies of the right to litigate questionable claims;
122. Cf E-mail from Bruce Wagman, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, to Dominick C. Capozzola (July 25, 2000,
09:12:00 PST) (on file with author) ("[A] strict liability standard simply allows free
potshots at insurers, mainly by lawyers who know they have a freebie as long as they can
demonstrate any potential problem. This is what the landscape looked like at the
beginning of bad faith, before insurers began to fight back, and I would suggest it is not
pretty for anyone-the ultimate cost is back at the insureds."). Professor Wagman's
concern can be alleviated, however, by limiting the recovery to consequential damages
when insurers act in good faith. The absence of punitive damages in those situations will
make taking "potshots" much less palatable.
123. Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.
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certainly, we do not want to provide incentive to insureds to commit
claims fraud.
In shaping an appropriate standard, it is imperative to remember
the social goals behind First-Party Bad Faith, including contract
enforcement and protection of the vulnerable insureds. Likewise, we
should not lose sight of the costs that each standard will impose; it is
easy to forget that a standard that allows insureds to recover large
sums will also result in higher premiums. While in the short run, a
victory over the insurance company resembles a societal gain, over
the long run, the benefit will be erased by higher payments.
Ultimately, the insurance companies will exact their losses from the
public as a whole.124
Unlike most contracts, people do not purchase insurance to
obtain an economic advantage. Rather, insureds buy insurance to
guard against catastrophe and secure their present status. For
instance, in a property insurance claim, a farm insured for $100,000
that incurs $5,000 worth of damage will receive $5,000 from the
insurance company. If that farm incurs $100,000 worth of damage, it
will receive $100,000. If the farmer has to spend $6,000 to litigate the
claim, full payment on the insurance policy will leave the farmer
$6,000 short of her prior status, depriving her of the full benefit of the
bargain.
Courts looking to assist parties like this farmer apply a lax
standard similar to Gruenberg, because insureds will be guaranteed
compensation for both the unreasonable and intentional acts of the
insurer.12 5 However, if the insurer reasonably disputes a claim and
loses, the Gruenberg standard will not guarantee the full benefit of
the bargain for the insured, because reasonable behavior will not
trigger extra-contractual damages.
Another problem with the Gruenberg standard is that it awards
punitive damages for accidental behavior. The purpose of punitive
damages is two-fold: to set an example and to punish the
124. Of course, this assumes no change in insurers' behavior. Punitive damages should
discourage bad faith breaches, thus reducing the number of occasions on which such
damages are recoverable. In other words, there should be a net gain to society by
discouraging harmful conduct. However, it remains true that if the costs of operating an
insurance company rise on account of punitive damages, the increased costs will
eventually be cast upon the consumer.
125. Hanson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 772 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1985); Chapman v.
Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 665 A.2d 112 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Seifert v.
Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1993); McKenzie v. Pac. Health &
Life Ins. Co., 847 P.2d 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
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defendant. 126 Allowing punitive damages for carelessness conflicts
with these goals, because it is impossible to deter insurers from
making honest mistakes. Likewise, it is cruel to punish an entity-
even an insurer-when its conduct does not merit such treatment.
Juries traditionally have not shown much sympathy for the insurance
companies, and they seldom hesitate to award punitive damages when
given the opportunity.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin properly addressed these
concerns in Anderson by instituting a recklessness standard.127
Reckless activity can be deterred, and it should be punished if it leads
to harmful consequences. Those courts that require actual malice go
too far to shield the insurance companies. Actual malice is difficult to
prove, and it does not encompass all of the situations where insurance
companies merit punitive damages. However, even if the courts
choose a recklessness standard, the insureds will remain less than
whole when the insurance company wrongly disputes a claim, but its
actions do not rise to the level of recklessness.
It appears that the courts are left with a dilemma. If they design
an easy standard for the insured to meet, insurers will refrain from
litigating meritorious claims; if the insurers are brave enough to take
their insureds to court and lose, they will be hit with enormous
damages that will trigger higher insurance premiums. However, if the
courts outline a stringent standard, the insureds will lose their
protection from opportunistic insurers that prey on the weaker and
more vulnerable insureds.
Fortunately, there is a solution.
B. Dividing the Standard
When the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted First-Party
Bad Faith, it anticipated the dilemma described above. It offered a
unique solution, namely, a bifurcated standard:
We hold today that if an insured can demonstrate bad faith or
unreasonable action by the insurer in processing a claim under their
mutually binding insurance contract, he can recover consequential
damages in a tort action. Actual damages are not limited by the
contract. Further, if he can demonstrate the insurer's actions were
126. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 39, at 650 ("Almost all the states have concluded
that sometimes damages may be awarded to punish the defendant or to make an example
of that defendant so that others will avoid this very serious kind of misconduct.").
127. Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,376 (Wis. 1978).
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willful or in reckless disregard of the insured's rights, he can
recover punitive damages.128
By dividing the consequential and punitive damages, the court
was able to institute a lax standard that protects the interests of the
insureds without unduly punishing insurers. Consequential damages
for negligent behavior allow the insureds to recover losses caused by
insurer error. Hence, if an insured's business goes bankrupt because
the insurance company negligently delayed payment, consequential
damages will make the insured whole again. The benefit of the
insurance policy will be secured for the insured, and yet the overall
damages will remain relatively low.
Looking to the second half of the standard, the implementation
of punitive damages for reckless and intentional conduct offered
deterrence against insurers that are prone to abusing their insureds.
This standard complies with the purposes of punitive damages,
because it punishes reckless and malicious acts while setting an
example for other insurers. 129 Additionally, limiting punitive damages
to these types of activities will prevent the upward pressure on
insurance premiums.
The South Carolina standard provides a solution to the dilemma
articulated in the previous section. However, that standard still does
not provide compensation to insureds whose insurers reasonably but
mistakenly withhold payments. The strict liability standard applied in
West Virginia makes better sense. If an insured enters into an
insurance contract to protect his present status, the costs incurred to
collect on a claim should be calculated into his award. Failure to do
so will deprive the insured of the benefit of the bargain.
Although it may be stretching the term "Bad Faith" to allow
extra-contractual damages for reasonable behavior, the policy reasons
for doing so are sound. Thus, courts looking for a workable standard
for First-Party Bad Faith should adopt the following standard: When
a policyholder substantially prevails in a first-party claim, the
policyholder is entitled to all consequential damages that resulted
from the insurer's error, regardless of the insurer's intent. If the
policyholder can establish that the insurer acted maliciously or
recklessly in regard to the claim, the court shall also award punitive
damages.
This standard guarantees for the policyholder the benefit of the
bargain, and it maximizes the deterrence value of First-Party Bad
128. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983).
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Faith. At the same time, it reduces the unfairness to the insurers to a
reasonable level; given that insurance companies eventually spread
new costs to the insureds, they can recover the consequential
damages that they will have to incur litigating debatable claims.
Conclusion
For the last three decades, courts have debated over First-Party
Bad Faith. Most have accepted the tort, but the wide variance in the
standards they apply has brought a great deal of confusion to the
matter. A sensible standard, applied uniformly throughout the states,
will bring predictability and fairness to the manner in which insurers
and insureds settle their first-party claims. The standard proposed in
this Note maximizes the insured's willingness to protect her interests
while deterring insurer misconduct. At the same time, the limits on
punitive damages do not over-burden the insurers who reasonably
choose to litigate a claim.

